سندی مهم درباره رصد دقیق تحولات ایران توسط سفیر انگلیس

۱۱ شهریور ۱۳۹۷ ساعت ۳:۲۶

در این سند تاریخی مهم گزارش محرمانه سرپرستی لرن سفیر انگلستان به اوستن چمبرلین راجع به اوضاع سیاسی ایران و وضعیت جناح های موجود در آستانه تغییر سلطنت قاجاریه آمده است

كافه تاريخ- سند

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SECTION 4.

[E 6930/18/34]

No. 1.

Sir P. Loraine to Mr. Austen Chamberlain .- (Received November 11.)

(No. 550. Most Confidential.)

Tehran, October 22, 1925.

IN my despatch No. 76 of the 10th February, and especially in the latter half of that despatch. I described so far as I was able the conditions and considerations which were urging Reza Khan Pahlevi to seek a higher and more unassailable position than the one which he now occupies. The solution of the crisis which then arose in that connection was reported in my despatch No. 107 of the 26th February. In my despatch No. 317, Confidential, of the 16th June, I pointed out that, notwith standing the solution of February, the question of the Shah, and perhaps of the dynasty also, was not solved, and that the uncertainty in that regard was exercising a baneful influence on the situation here. I further expressed the opinion that Reza Khan would not attempt to raise the question a third time, but would rather bide his moment and await events.

2. As I have had the honour to report in a series of recent telegrams, this expectation has not been fulfilled, and the issue as regards the Shah and the dynasty has been reopened. It will be remembered that an invitation to His Imperial Majesty to return to Persia was issued several months ago, and that nothing but evasive replies were received. The inference drawn here was that the Shah did not intend to return, at all events unless he received some assurances of guarantees from a foreign Power (see my despatch No. 508 of the 29th September). In these circumstances the sudden and unexpected announcement of His Majesty's resolve to sail from Marseilles on the 2nd October came as somewhat of a bombshell. Failing that announcement, I think that Reza Khan would have been content to leave matters where they stood; in the presence of the announcement he evidently made up his mind that the issue must be raised again. His first step in that direction was presumably the so-called bread riots which were described in my despatch No. 507 of the 29th September. This manœuvre fell rather flat. The second attempt was through an agitation got up in Tabriz, as reported in my telegram No. 313 of the 10th October, against the return of the Shah, and later on against the retention of the Kajar Dynasty, which was reflected in other provinces such as Resht, Isfahan and Meshed, the agitation being accompanied by a round-up of suspected Communists and their agents in Tabriz and Meshed, following the one which had already taken place in Tehran. My telegrams No. 317 of the 13th October, Nos. 327 and 328 of the 19th October and No. 332 of the 21st October have acquainted you with the subsequent course of events and with the most reliable information I can obtain, throwing light on their causes and the motive forces at work.

3. The whole situation is extremely complicated and very difficult to analyse. I think the following points, which have been elicited from the Minister for Foreign Affairs in personal and confidential conversation with myself, are pretty reliable:—

(a.) No one is really acquainted with the Prime Minister's true intentions, nor with the extent to which he is prepared to press them; and there is no Persian with sufficient courage or sense of personal security to ask him point-blank what he means to do, and insist on an answer.

(b.) All serious work, whether in connection with internal or external questions, is in suspense, and will remain so until this question of the Shah and the dynasty is cleared up; and all other questions are being examined by the Prime Minister in their bearing on the main question and not on their intrinsic merits or importance.

(c.) The expectation that a homogeneous Cabinet acting in close contact with the Majority bloc of the parties of the Right under Modarres would act as a steadying and guiding influence on the Prime Minister, and would lead to a clearer definition of Persia's policy, both internal and external, has been falsified. The parliamentary majority is a sham majority and can always be split up by manœuvring the fraction leaders on the lines

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